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Abstract 
Purpose: Employee voice plays an important role in organizational intelligence about patient safety 
hazards and other influences on quality of care. This article reports a case study of an academic 
medical center that aimed to understand barriers to voice and to make improvements in identifying 
and responding to transgressive or disruptive behaviors. 
Methods: The case study focuses on a large academic medical entity that sought to improve employee 
voice using a two-phase approach of diagnosis and intervention. Initially, confidential interviews with 
67 individuals (20 senior leaders and 47 frontline personnel) were conducted during 2014 to diagnose 
causes of employee reluctance to give voice. A structured intervention program (2014-2016) to 
encourage voice was then implemented response to the findings. 
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Results: The diagnostic interviews revealed gaps between espoused policies of encouraging employee 
voice and what happened in practice.  A culture of fear pervaded the organization and, together with a 
widespread perception of futility, inhibited personnel from speaking up about concerns. The 
intervention phase involved four actions: sharing the interview findings; coordinating and formalizing 
mechanisms for identifying and dealing with disruptive behavior; training leaders in encouraging 
voice; and building capacity for difficult conversations.  
Conclusion: The problems of giving voice are widely known across the organizational literature, but 
difficult to address. This case study offers an approach that includes diagnostic and intervention 
phases that may be helpful in remaking norms, facilitating employee voice, and improving 
organizational response. It highlights specific actions that are available for other organizations to 
adapt and test. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Healthcare is highly vulnerable to failures of organizational intelligence about hazards that may cause 
harm to patients,1 yet, as in other sectors,2-4 valuable sources of information about risks and about 
what may be going wrong are often under-valued.5 Employees are among the most important sources 
of “soft intelligence” about issues of poor care, faulty systems or inappropriate conduct that can harm 
patients.6 Yet problems of silence (employees do not speak) and deafness (organizations do not hear 
or act) remain pervasive,7 especially (though not only) in face of transgressive or disruptive behaviors 
by colleagues.8  
A literature on employee voice characterizes the voicing of concerns as the discretionary disclosure of 
information intended to improve organizational functioning to someone with the perceived authority 
to act,9 but also makes clear that enabling and acting on voice are not straightforward.10  At the sharp 
end, hierarchies and professional boundaries11 and concerns about the potential to damage 
relationships12  may inhibit voice. A tendency towards ‘comfort-seeking’ rather than ‘problem-
sensing’ behaviors13 at leadership level – the so-called “blunt end” of care – may further stifle voice.  
These challenges may be especially prominent when the issue of concern is transgressive or disruptive 
behaviors by powerful individuals, including misconduct, incivility, unreasonableness, bullying, 
harassment and disrespect.14 Such behaviors are known to have profoundly negative effects on 
performance and culture.15 16 Allowing such behaviors to go unsanctioned may have deeply negative 
effects,17 interfering with employees’ psychological safety,18 undermining joint endeavor, increasing 
employee turnover, frustrating efforts to learn and improve, increasing costs19 and ultimately 
increasing risks to patients.  Healthcare is now recognizing that a major responsibility of system 
leaders is that of fostering climates and cultures of respect – in part encouraged by the realization that 
high-reliability organizations in other sectors do likewise.20 The first step, of course, is gaining 
knowledge of the problems. The second is doing something about them. Neither is easy, but both are 
essential.21 
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In this article, we describe how Johns Hopkins Medicine (JHM), a large academic medicine entity, 
sought to improve its ability to detect and manage safety concerns, including transgressive/disruptive 
behaviors, and to mount a program of improvement. 
2 Methods 
We report a case study22 of an improvement effort that involved two phases: 1) a diagnostic phase, 
involving interviews with JHM personnel conducted by an independent team of evaluators and 2) an 
intervention phase that responded to the diagnostic findings. 
Diagnosis phase: Interview study 
Following discovery of serious misconduct by a physician, JHM commissioned a team of evaluators 
(authors MDW, GM, JW, CT, AC and EA) from a UK university to explore influences on employee 
voice through a qualitative interview study. In early 2014, heads of five purposively selected 
departments across the JHM system that represented the majority of faculty and staff (Medicine, 
Surgery, Neurology, Pediatrics and Anesthesiology and Critical Care Medicine) were asked to 
distribute an email asking personnel at all levels to take part in confidential, anonymized interviews. 
A separate email from the Senior Vice President for Quality invited senior leaders (e.g. departmental 
chairs, executives, board members) to participate. A secure link, which could not be monitored by 
anyone at JHM, was provided for direct response to the evaluation team. Every individual who 
responded and agreed to be interviewed participated in the study: no sampling within the respondents 
was undertaken. 
Interviews were conducted during Spring 2014 using a semi-structured prompt guide that included 
questions about people’s general views and experiences of raising patient safety concerns and 
hypothetical scenarios that included transgressive or disruptive behaviours. Senior leaders were 
interviewed either in person or by telephone by author GM; others by author JW, all by telephone. All 
interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim except that all identifying details were 
removed to ensure anonymity.  
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This study was submitted to the Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review Board (IRB) and was 
deemed Quality Improvement.  Consent was taken orally to avoid creating a written record of 
individuals’ participation. No transcripts were shared with JHM. 
Data analysis was based on the constant comparative method.23 Ten interviews were open-coded line-
by-line by AC. The open codes, together with sensitizing constructs derived from the literature, were 
used by AC, MDW and GM to develop an initial coding frame which was applied to subsequent 
interview transcripts, and was iteratively refined until all the transcripts were analyzed.  NVivo 10 
software was used to manage the coding and analysis process.   
In presenting our findings we attribute quotations to either frontline (FL) or senior leader (SL) 
participants. Sometimes details of quotations have been disguised in order to assure confidentiality.  
Phase 2: Intervention phase 
An anonymised report of the interview study was shared with the JHM leadership team in July 2014. 
The actions that JHM leaders (including authors PP, JC and MC) took in response over the following 
two years (up to Summer 2016) were shared verbally and through notes and documentation with the 
evaluation team, who summarized the material and checked back understanding. We present the 
account of these actions descriptively below. 
3 Results 
For the diagnostic phase, we organised our analysis around the themes of: the untouchables; the gap 
between policy and practice; whether it was safe to speak; whether it was worth speaking up; and 
responding to and acting on the findings. For the intervention phase, the themes included: publicly 
sharing the study findings; coordinating and formalizing mechanisms to identify, assess and remedy 
disruptive behaviour; training in leadership behaviors to encourage voice; building capacity to have 
difficult conversations, and impact.  
The diagnostic phase 
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Reponses to the invitation to interview were received from 118 personnel (91 frontline and 27 senior 
leaders). We interviewed everyone with whom it was possible to arrange an interview (47 frontline 
and 20 senior leaders: 67 in total). Because of the nature of the distribution mechanism, it was not 
possible to determine a precise response rate. Many participants reported how much they appreciated 
the opportunity to describe their experiences and perceptions, suggesting that the interviews 
themselves may have been a valuable intervention.  
3.1 The untouchables 
Many of the challenges of giving voice at JHM were personified in the widely-discussed problem of 
‘the untouchables’:  individuals, usually senior physicians, who appeared to engage in transgressive or 
disruptive conduct with impunity. 
A lot of times they’re just real jerks, so they’re just mean people – they just yell at people and 
they think that they can do whatever they want basically. (SL)   
The untouchables’ ability to get away with egregious behavior was reported to derive from their 
positions of power within the organization or their capacity for revenue generation, or both.  
It turns out after discussion amongst ourselves that he’s sort of one of these untouchables. It’s 
very hard to discipline him, we can’t ever get him to comply, he does whatever he wants and 
sometimes people are afraid to confront, particularly the surgeons and physicians that are seen 
as being big revenue generators.  (SL) 
The effects of these kinds of behaviors were toxic. Direct breaches of safety rules clearly offered a 
primary risk of harm. But the secondary effects were, in many ways, at least as important: the 
untouchables contributed to tense, conflict-laden oppressive working environments that constrained 
their colleagues’ abilities to take joy or pride in their work, with all the attendant risks of such a 
context – including poor teamwork and difficulties in staff retention.  
The scrub nurse came out of the operating room very flustered. She said ‘there’s only so much 
I can do, I told him to put on his isolation gown and he just refused to do it, he’s not doing it 
and I can’t – I can only push it so far’. (SL) 
Unsanctioned rule breaches risked normalization of deviance,24 especially when more junior 
colleagues looked to the untouchables as role models. The failure to deal with the problems 
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contributed to an erosion of trust in senior management, and was a major feature of the culture of fear 
that pervaded the organization. 
Until very recently, there has been very weak leadership of this area.  It wouldn’t address 
problems anyhow. I think [the leadership of] the department is best described as a bunch of 
cowboys. (SL) 
3.1.1 The gap between policy and practice 
Though senior leaders emphasised the need for concerns about patient safety and quality of care to be 
raised, and described multiple mechanisms to support this, the reality was that the organization lacked 
coordinated processes to identify, assess and remedy disruptive physician behaviors. Not everyone in 
the organization knew of the procedures to report concerns, and the systems were tedious, complex, 
unreliable and lacking in clarity for accountability. Information was reported through many different 
channels (e.g. error reporting, human resources) that varied in their definitions of disruptive behavior, 
in their procedures and in their impact.  
They make it very difficult to report your managers. I mean I would still do it, but all the 
protocols and red tape that they put on it makes it very difficult for the person who is going 
through the bad experience [to] get some sort of satisfaction. (FL) 
 
3.2 Is it safe to speak? 
Although participants reported some positive experiences in voicing concerns, more common was the 
finding that organizational silence was linked to an underlying culture of fear.  Participants reported 
that fear permeated the organization and hindered personnel at all levels – from the most junior to the 
most senior – from reporting concerns that might challenge the interests of others or disrupt the status 
quo. 
He wasn't going to raise [the concern] because it would take the project off the time-line […] 
because the pressure of the leadership and colleagues and everybody would be, ‘What is the 
matter with you?  You're not a team player, don't you get it?’ That's it.  It's a generalized 
pressure to stay in your box – it's not your business – and conform.  And it's really, really, 
really deep and nobody is going to step out of it and nobody does. (SL) 
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The reasons for this fearfulness were varied. The dynamics of power and blaming behavior, intent on 
the defense of positions and territories, meant that people were afraid that challenging powerful 
individuals and their allies would limit their careers, that raising concerns would escalate into conflict 
and recrimination, that they would be labeled as a snitch, a whiner, a poor performer or an alarmist, or 
that they could be subject to retaliation.  
You only have to be on the other end of a lashing before you decide you’re not going to do 
that again. And so going one–on-one and trying to get it resolved, that’s not part of what we 
do in the culture. Having been the recipient of it a number of times, it’s very risky. (SL) 
Other fears centered on the risk that raising concerns could result in exposure to litigation, prolonged 
and draining conflict with no assurance of success, or accusations of discriminatory behavior.  
I should really speak up and say something here, but number one, I know from history that it's 
not going to be well received, and I know that it's going to end up putting me in a worse 
position and that's not going to accomplish anything.  (FL)  
Those who thought themselves to be at some kind of disadvantage – perhaps by being new or in a 
hierarchically inferior position – were reported to be especially nervous about speaking. 
Residents felt it was academic suicide to ever question or raise an issue with an attending. 
(SL) 
3.3 Is it worth speaking up? 
People’s beliefs about the likely effects of giving voice to their concerns strongly influenced their 
inclination to speak. Understandably, having a positive experience appeared to reinforce willingness 
to voice concerns, and many encouraging examples were reported. But participants also reported 
hostile responses to attempts to raise concerns. 
[The doctor] didn’t see the patient. He became verbal, very irate. So I just walked away. It 
wasn’t doing any good and I had approached him quietly but it did no good. (FL)  
Perhaps more common than hostile responses were non-responses. Senior leaders and those at the 
sharp end perceived that their concerns were not always taken seriously or that nothing happened. 
Reluctance by senior management to grasp long-standing thorny problems and a lack of 
organizational commitment and capacity for problem-solving were described, resulting in difficult 
situations persisting over long periods of time without being remedied. 
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They’ve been frustrated by things for so long that [they think] why bother? (SL) 
Again, it’s a leadership issue, they [don’t] pay attention or just pooh-pooh it instead of 
seriously addressing it. (FL) 
People reported that they sometimes simply stopped raising concerns, because to do so was irrational: 
it invited risk without any prospect of benefit. In consequence, many at the sharp end expressed 
frustration that although the organization invited staff and faculty to speak about concerns, it appeared 
to lack an authentic capacity for listening or a full commitment to address concerns. 
[There are] pockets of historically weak leadership where we learn that there have been 
ongoing issues for years that people [managers] have been either unwilling or uncomfortable 
addressing.  So after a while you just stop talking about it. (SL) 
 
3.4 The intervention phase: responding to and acting on the findings 
The first step of the intervention phase involved the evaluation team reporting the findings of the 
interview study in report form (Summer 2014) and through presentations to JHM leaders (Fall 2014-
Spring 2015). In response, leaders instituted a structured program of improvement involving four key 
actions: 1) publicly sharing the findings; 2) coordinating and formalizing mechanisms for identifying 
and dealing with disruptive behavior; 3) training leaders in how to encourage voice; and 4) building 
capacity to have difficult conversations. Much of this organizational response was informed by the 
literature suggesting that voice behaviors (speaking out to peers and up to supervisors) increase when 
employees are provided greater opportunities to give voice and when they believe that their input will 
make a difference, known as “voice instrumentality”.25 
Action 1: Publicly share the study findings 
The findings of the study were shared publicly with stakeholder groups across the JHM system.  In 
Spring 2015, the evaluation team  personally presented the study results at the JHM Patient Safety and 
Quality Board meeting, targeting senior leaders, as well as at town-hall meetings to which all 
personnel (especially those at the sharp end) were invited, with large attendances. In addition, senior 
leaders from JHM presented the results in multiple forums, including departmental directors, 
departments and nursing groups throughout 2015.  
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This widespread sharing of the discomfiting findings had a marked effect, with many remarking that it 
signaled a new openness and a willingness on the part of senior leadership to listen to concerns. One 
immediate impact was that several staff members came forward with new confidence to report 
colleagues with chronic and severe disruptive behavioral problems. A typical comment was “You say 
you want to hear about untouchables; I want to share my concerns to see if you are serious”.  
Action 2: Coordinate and formalize mechanisms to identify, assess and remedy disruptive behavior 
A major response to the findings of the interview study was to coordinate and formalize the multiple 
initiatives and mechanisms for raising concerns. Many initiatives had been underway since 2010-2012 
but were operating in silos. Improved coordination and communication was seen as critical to 
rationalising and professionalizing the multiple channels and ensuring appropriate action.  
A critical feature of the newly integrated approach was a program known as Safe at Hopkins, which 
had been in development since 2011, had had a “soft launch” in 2013, began to operate broadly in 
2014-2-15, and upgraded its website in 2015. Developed out of workplace violence prevention 
initiatives by the leader of the JHM risk assessment team and other behaviorally trained colleagues, it 
was purposefully designed to work outside the formal faculty and hierarchical structures. It sought to 
promote a culture of safety through prevention and early intervention in unprofessional, transgressive 
and disruptive behaviors, and was specifically positioned to provide psychological safety. It collects 
concerns about disruptive, bullying or violent behavior and any impact on the workplace, and where 
appropriate, may conduct an in-depth review of the concerns. It uses a structured interview approach 
to classify behaviors in order to develop themes and make recommendations. Team members are 
explicit in initial conversations that they are exploring potentially concerning behaviour without 
specifically identifying any individual; they speak broadly with students, residents, staff, faculty, and 
administrators, and aim to offer a safe place to discuss concerns and options for addressing them.  
Where needed, Safe at Hopkins works in partnership with a high-level leader within JHM.to 
remediate individuals’ behaviour, initially through communication that emphasizes the impact of 
disruptive behavior on a culture of safety and the working climate.  Individuals may also be referred 
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for coaching or other skill-building.  But if behavior does not improve, the leader may cite the Safe at 
Hopkins review and remove the person is from her/his position of power. Though the HR processes 
are different for different employees, the system applies to all faculty and staff. To promote a 
collective understanding and common language, disruptive behaviors were described explicitly, 
supported by the Johns Hopkins Continuum of Disruptive Behaviors at Work (Figure 1) which 
identified unwanted behaviors, providing explanations and examples. A flowchart of various types of 
behavior that must be referred to specific offices (e.g. for legal reasons) was also developed, and a 
checklist provided to departmental leaders. 
A further key element of the newly coordinated approach to raising concerns was the creation of a 
Physician Executive Oversight Committee (PEOC), which includes leaders  from the Johns Hopkins 
University SOM (faculty employer), and the Johns Hopkins Health System (employer of staff and 
non-faculty physicians). Its work is protected from discovery in legal proceedings. Meeting quarterly, 
it communicates and coordinates information, triangulating data from multiple sources, including the 
incident reporting system, employee engagement surveys, informal reports, Safe at Hopkins, and 
others. The PEOC does not itself have investigatory or disciplinary remit. However, a signal deemed 
sufficiently severe or chronic may result in the Vice Dean’s Office or other leader initiating a review 
and potentially issuing sanctions. 
 Action 3: Training in leadership behaviors to encourage voice 
Organizational research suggests that leaders’ behaviors and the structures they create are central to 
shaping cultures that facilitate speaking up.25 In addition to sharing the results of the diagnostic phase 
widely with leaders across JHM, leaders were, shortly after the feedback from the diagnostic 
interviews, provided with training and tools regarding voice opportunities, including how their staff 
could report concerns. The process for identifying and investigating disruptive behaviors was 
discussed at Board and Leadership meetings. Leaders were given advice about coaching to enable 
them to facilitate voice instrumentality, for example by creating psychological safety to report and 
ensuring zero tolerance for retaliation.     
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Action 4: Build capacity to have difficult conversations 
Following the interview study, senior leaders met with departmental directors to better understand 
directors’ barriers to addressing disruptive physicians more effectively. Department directors and 
medical staff leaders welcomed the findings of the interview study in exposing the challenges they 
faced, and further welcomed the Safe at Hopkins program as it provided them “cover and support”. 
But many described their discomfort in raising concerns with particular individuals. An external 
expert was engaged to develop a course with a 30-minute e-learning module followed by a two-hour 
interactive simulation workshop in summer 2015 in which leaders practiced having difficult 
conversations..      
3.5 Impact of the intervention phase 
Though not yet evaluated formally, the interventions seem to be having an impact.  Over a two-year 
period from the time the problem of “untouchables” came to prominence after the interview study 
(2014), the Safe at Hopkins program consulted on 382 reports of disruptive behavior, and conducted 
55 in-depth reviews involving over 400 interviews, including 20 reviews of individuals in superior 
positions to those impacted by the behavior. The vast majority of reported individuals were referred 
for additional support. Nine were eventually removed from their positions of power.  
Decisions are confidential, but the changes in a physician’s role in the institution are not. The Safe at 
Hopkins program has received positive responses from staff: for example, “I never thought I would 
see the day when Hopkins leaders addressed this person’s behavior; thank you; perhaps we have a 
culture change occurring”. One manager, after attending an open town-hall on the interview study, 
submitted a concern about a “chronic untouchable”, who had significant power in the 
organization.,An investigation was then initiated and the individual moved. The manager responded, 
“I have been at Hopkins 20 years, and never thought I would see the day when this type of behavior is 
not tolerated. You have done more to restore my faith in leadership with this action than all of you 
have done over the last 20 years, thank you.” 
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4 Discussion  
Though the problem of disruptive behaviors is widely described in the literature, it is rarely easy to 
address. 26,27 Diagnostic interviews showed that two prominent features of the culture at JHM were 
implicated in reluctance to speak: first, a hierarchical culture pervaded by a generalized fearfulness at 
almost every level, where territories and autonomies were often fiercely defended by powerful 
individuals and their allies; and second, uncertainties about whether positive action would result from 
the exercise of voice.  The problem known colloquially as “untouchables” – individuals who engaged 
with impunity in transgressive/disruptive behavior – corrupted the conditions of a healthy working 
environment, resulting in personnel feeling fearful and lacking in psychological safety: 28   An 
especially unfortunate consequence was that failure to tackle these problems eroded trust in senior 
management.  
Little of what was found at JHM in the interviews is unusual. The problems of exercising voice 
challenge most major industries world-wide.29-31 Through the goals they set, where they focus their 
attention, their communications and information-sharing, the structures and programs they create, and 
other decisions and actions, leaders shape cultures by signalling what is and is not important, and how 
organizational members should act and interpret events,32 while employees make sense of the overall 
pattern of signals sent by organizational leaders.33 The interviews showed that employees made sense 
of discrepancies between espoused and enacted priorities for raising concerns, and in so doing socially 
verified what they thought really mattered. This is why the second, interventional phase was vital in 
demonstrating JHM’s willingness to confront the issues and take action to reduce the risks to patients 
associated with silence, deafness, and inaction. 
Some elements of what we describe here, including Safe at Hopkins, share characteristics with other 
professionalism initiatives,34 suggesting emerging consensus on the need for structured processes for 
identifying and acting on concerns for individuals. The approach as a whole, from diagnostics through 
to intervention, is more than any single element, however. The commissioning of the interview study 
and the wide public sharing of the findings was an intervention in its own right, demonstrating to 
14 
 
skeptical colleagues a new appetite for learning in the organization. It signaled that the gap between 
what was said and what was being done was narrowing. The subsequent action plan, the coordination 
of mechanisms for raising and responding to concerns, and the resulting removal of senior individuals 
from positions of power, were evidence of important shifts in the attention given to hearing employee 
voice and the fresh commitment of the organization to tackle difficult problems. The approach thus 
supported the remaking what Detert and Edmondson term “implicit voice theories”10 that result in 
people self-censoring at work.    
We propose that the approach we describe here offers potentially generalizable principles (List 1) that 
could be evaluated in other contexts. The practical delivery of the program, of course, requires energy 
and resources. The Safe at Hopkins program is funded by Johns Hopkins Health System and Johns 
Hopkins University, and currently employs one investigator who leads the program with 
administrative support. A (non-compensated) committee structure is also needed, though new IT 
systems are not. Perhaps most importantly, however, the approach requires courageous institutional 
leadership, and a fearless commitment to organizational values and mission. The mandate for the 
initial interview study and subsequent actions came from the trustees of JHM, and was implemented 
jointly by university and health system leadership.  
This study has limitations. Owing to the confidential nature of the interviews, it was not possible to 
determine the representativeness of the interview participants; Johns Hopkins employs approximately 
32,000 full and part-time employees, and hosts 12,000 graduate, professional, and medical students. 
No formal evaluation has taken place of the action plan, so it is not possible to draw firm conclusions 
about its impacts. Instead, these actions may be regarded as hypotheses for further testing, perhaps in 
other contexts. Future work should also include economic evaluation of the costs and benefits of this 
approach.  
4.1 Conclusions 
Organizations that tolerate disrespectful behaviors will struggle to create the norms and values 
necessary to provide safe, patient-centered and efficient care and a joyful work environment. If health 
systems are to deliver safe, high-quality care, and if healthcare employees are to feel respected and 
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have joy in work, health system leaders (at all levels) need to demonstrate their commitment to 
hearing from their own personnel about safety concerns, and then respond authentically. The 
systematic efforts we have described here may provide useful principles and a model that can be 
evaluated in new contexts to help others address similar problems.  
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